Back
to the bad old days in the CHT
No
accord will be able to bring peace in the CHT unless the government
recognizes the rights and identity of indigenous Jumma people
and take effective measures for promotion and protection of
their rights, writes Rabi Shankar Chakma
Six years have elapsed since
the signing of the much-vaunted CHT Accord of 2 December 1997.
The accord was signed after a protracted negotiation between
the government of Bangladesh and the Jana Samhati Samiti for
five years. It is often said such protracted negotiations
becomes more successful than summit level accord because of
the ability to identify pros-cons of an accord and therefore
develop in-built mechanisms for its better implementation.
Alas! The CHT accord did not contain such in-built mechanisms
for implementation. The aim to "uphold the political,
social, cultural, educational and economic rights of all the
people of Chittagong Hill Tracts region, to expedite socio-economic
development process and to preserve respective rights of all
the citizens of Bangladesh and their development" has
little meaning for indigenous peoples of the CHT.
Among the major shortcomings
of the Accord was the negotiation process itself. It was neither
transparent nor democratic. Both the JSS and the government
kept the citizens of the country in dark about the whole process,
let alone making them part of it. The whole thing was done
in a secretive way as if everything would turn up side down
if the people knew about it.
The in-built mechanisms are
crucial for smooth implementation. When an agreement is signed,
there arise certain obligations for the parties to perform.
The breach of such an agreement should normally be settled
before the court of law. This is the general rule relating
to contractual obligation. But contracts of political nature,
that is the accords and treaties signed between the political
parties and states, are quite different. Courts cannot enforce
such accords although courts can question validity of such
accord. Aggrieved parties do not have the right to seek redress
in law courts. That's why governments has shown contempt for
such accord and history of indigenous peoples all over the
world is replete with instances of such failed accords.
The CHT accord enunciated the obligations to be fulfilled
both by the Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) and the government of
Bangladesh. The JSS performed all its obligations before the
government performed any single obligation on its part. As
per the CHT treaty the JSS was bound to do so within a specific
time frame. However, this became the source of all later discords
between the two sides. Once the JSS lost all leverage against
the government, the then Awami League government found it
expedient to back out. Acceptance of such provisions by JSS
was tantamount to giving carte-blanch to the government.
At the beginning the JSS leaders
were over enthusiastic about the accord. They placed unqualified
trust and faith in the Awami League government. On many occasions
the JSS supremo Santu Larma said that he had full confidence
in the government of the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
But it took only a few months before they were completely
disillusioned with the Awami League. Soon after their surrender
the JSS leaders could realize that their arithmetic of politics
of Bangladeshi ruling parties was totally wrong. They found
out in no time that they have been betrayed. So the honeymoon
between the two sides proved to be too short-lived. The first
discord between the Awami League and the Jana Samhati Samiti
arose when the JSS leaders publicly made a claim that there
was an unwritten agreement in addition to the Accord signed.
When the Awami League did not have any interest to implement
the written accord, it was fanciful to the extreme to expect
the Awami League to discuss any verbal accord. It was simply
a case of inability of the JSS leaders to understand the Awami
League, and for that matter the character of the ruling parties
of Bangladesh. The JSS also accused the AL of violating the
terms of the agreement when the government nominated three
members for the Interim Regional Council from the Bengali
community in total disregard of the JSS recommendation. In
protest against this action of the government the JSS refused
to take over the charge of the Interim Regional Council. But
JSS could not hold on to its position. After nine months they
had to give in, as the government threatened to reconstitute
the Interim Regional Council to resolve the stalemate. The
JSS leaders felt they might be left out.
The JSS leaders consistently
accused the previous Awami League government of violating
the CHT accord. They are now grumbling against the ruling
BNP led four party alliance. However, their grumble does not
go beyond the nuisance value, lest the BNP government may
dislodge them from the Regional Council either through elections
or summary removal.
The CHT accord is now in limbo.
The BNP and its alliance partners vehemently opposed the treaty
when they were in opposition. They demanded that the treaty
be scraped as it compromised the sovereignty of the county.
BNP went to the extent of organising a so-called "long
march" from Dhaka to Khagrachari to boost support for
their demand. So it is quite understandable that the alliance
government has little interest in the implementation of the
accord. This makes the future of the accord all the more uncertain.
Even after six years, the accord remains unimplemented. The
accord has failed because of its sheer non-implementation
due to the lack of in-built mechanism. The implementation
of the CHT accord totally depends on the charity of the government.
This is the most pathetic aspect of the accord.
The United Peoples Democratic
Front (UPDF) and its sister organisations namely Hill Students
Council, Hill Peoples Council and Hill Women's Federation
expressed serious reservations about the accord. They pointed
out its shortcomings and maintained that unless the main demands
of the CHT people are met the much-cherished peace will remain
a far cry. They voiced their criticism when almost the whole
country was gripped by euphoria about the accord. But once
the euphoria subsided and the dust settled down, every thing
became clear. The post accord situation has vindicated UPDF
assumptions. Even the topmost leader of the JSS acknowledged
that he has committed a grave mistake by signing the accord.
The accord of 1997 may be
historically important, but it is not the first of its kind.
The CHT people are witness to two other similar agreements.
The aim of both of these agreements was to resolve the Chittagong
Hill Tracts problem. The first agreement was signed in 1985
with the Priti Kumar faction of the JSS. This resulted in
the surrender of its members at Rangamti Stadium much like
the formal surrender of the main JSS on 15 February 1988 at
Khagrachari stadium. It should be noted that many good things
were written in the said agreement, although it too remained
largely unimplemented. The other agreement was signed in 1989
with some selected so-called traditional Jumma leaders of
three CHT districts. This was the agreement which paved the
way for the formation of the controversial Hill District Councils.
As everyone knows, none of these agreements was able to resolve
the problems.
In conclusion, the accord
of 1997 has already met the same fate of the two other agreements
mentioned above. A historic accord is now in the process of
being consigned to history. It is a pity that the CHT people
will have to witness such a tragedy. However, no accord will
be able to bring peace in the CHT unless the government recognizes
the rights and identity of indigenous Jumma people and take
effective measures for promotion and protection of their rights.
The sooner the government develops the democratic attitude
to address the demands of its ethnic minorities, the sooner
peace will return to the CHT.
(On this day in 1997, a landmark deal was reached on peace
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts)
The writer is a member of
the Convening Committee of the United Peoples Democratic Front
The article was published
in the New Age on December 2, 2003
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